Publisher：Environmental and Resource Economics  

We develop a two-sector dynamic model of trade and the environment. Both resource-good and manufacturing sectors generate environmental burdens that can adversely affect the environment in a country over time. The resource-good sector is environmentally sensitive, with its productivity suffering in line with declines in the environmental stock. Countries can be categorized into two types: one in which the resource-good sector is more environmentally harmful than the manufacturing sector, and another in which the opposite is true. At every point in time, labor allocations and specialization patterns under free trade are dependent on country size, technology, household preferences, and environmental stocks. Trading countries’ types have implications for the dynamics of environmental stocks and the corresponding environmental and welfare consequences of trade. If two trading countries are of the same type, one country exports its dirtier goods and the other must export its cleaner goods; consequently, at least one country gains from trade. If the two countries are of different types, they can export their respective dirtier goods and may both lose from trade.

DOI： 10.1007/s10640-022-00713-x

Web of Science

Scopus

Language：Japanese   Publisher：Dynamic Games and Applications  

This study develops a two-country differential game model of transboundary pollution control with a continuum of polluting and oligopolistic industries. Governments choose the paths of their pollution permits, the market-clearing prices of which are determined endogenously, as in a general oligopolistic equilibrium model. We consider both autarky and bilateral free trade of polluting goods and derive solutions under international cooperation, open-loop Nash equilibrium, and linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in each regime. Under autarky, we obtain similar results to those in the literature; that is, international cooperation achieves the least pollution, and the linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium results in higher pollution than the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Under free trade, each country’s welfare depends on the emissions of both countries, and if trade is frictionless, the same solution can be achieved by international cooperation, the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and the linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, when all industries have the same number of firms and trade is frictionless, free trade is better for the environment than autarky. However, if trade costs exist, international trade may result in higher pollution than autarky.

DOI： 10.1007/s13235-022-00434-2

Web of Science

Scopus

Language：Japanese   Publisher：Review of World Economics  

This study considers endogenous domestic standards on products to control negative consumption externalities using a three-country model of international oligopoly with a possible free trade agreement (FTA). The authors examine how the level of product standards and welfare are affected under an FTA and how the harmonization of standards affects the impact of the FTA. They find that if asymmetries in preferences or transboundary externalities are not too strong, an FTA makes product standards more stringent. In such a case, the FTA may or may not make the member countries better off, but it does make the non-member country better off. They also demonstrate that harmonizing the standards across the FTA members makes an FTA more favorable.

DOI： 10.1007/s10290-021-00446-x

Web of Science

Scopus

Language：Japanese   Publisher：International Tax and Public Finance  

This study examines the effects of tax policies in a dynamic model of a polluted small open economy with two sources of flow pollution—consumption and production—controlled by consumption and income taxes. In this setting, accumulated pollution negatively impacts households’ utility. We show that in a decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium under exogenous tax rates, whereas a permanent increase in consumption and income taxes unambiguously reduces the steady-state pollution stock, a temporary increase in these taxes may lead to more pollution in the long run. This outcome suggests that more stringent environmental policies might be ineffective if the regulation is only temporary. We also derive the socially optimal solution and examine the optimal tax paths to achieve the social optimum. If distaste and leisure effects are sufficiently strong, tax rates decrease along the optimal path as pollution increases over time, and vice versa.

DOI： 10.1007/s10797-021-09679-w

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Scopus

Publisher：Canadian Journal of Economics  

This study conducts a detailed analysis of the production possibility frontier (PPF) in an economy with two goods, each produced using labour and a specific factor as inputs, and public infrastructure, which has positive externalities on the production of each good. We show that if the elasticity of a specific factor input into production is sufficiently small, the PPF has a concave–convex–concave shape. Although our model is similar to the one developed in 1992 by Richard H. Clarida and Ronald Findlay, this possibility was overlooked in their analysis and it can generate trade patterns that are against the law of comparative advantage. Nevertheless, trade is always gainful and, as in the existing studies, trade openness increases the provision of public infrastructure in a country exporting goods whose productivity is highly dependent on infrastructure. We also examine the relationship between factor endowments and comparative advantage.

DOI： 10.1111/caje.12589

Web of Science

Scopus

Language：Japanese   Publisher：International Review of Economics and Finance  

This paper develops a three-country model of intra-industry trade under imperfect competition with trade costs between countries to examine the effects of a free trade agreement (FTA). Under sufficiently high trade costs, FTA member countries might have an incentive to set optimal external tariffs that are higher than the pre-FTA optimal tariffs (i.e., the tariff complementarity effect may not exist) and the formation of an FTA may worsen the non-member country's welfare. Whether the member countries benefit from the FTA depends on the trade costs and the degree of substitutability among differentiated goods.

DOI： 10.1016/j.iref.2021.10.012

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Scopus

Language：Japanese   Publisher：Asia Pacific Journal of Regional Science  

In this paper, we consider a Ricardian type of economy with public infrastructure, which is of “creation of atmosphere” type or “unpaid factor” type. We show that, although the production possibility frontier is convex in the creation of atmosphere type of infrastructure but is concave in the unpaid factor type, the optimal supply of public infrastructure increases according to an increase in the good that is more heavily dependent on the infrastructure along the production possibility frontier for both types. Subsequently, we showed that a country with larger labor endowment likely exports the good more heavily dependent on public infrastructure in the creation of atmosphere case, while that country likely exports the other good in the unpaid factor case.

DOI： 10.1007/s41685-020-00162-8

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Scopus

Publisher：Mathematics  

This paper develops a two-country model of intra-industry trade with trade costs that can be reduced by public investment in an international infrastructure capital, the stock of which accumulates over time. Depending on the trade costs and international distribution of manufacturing firms, equilibrium patterns of trade are determined, and national welfare in each country is affected by these trade patterns. Taking into account the relationship between trade costs and national welfare, the governments carry out a dynamic game of public investment. We show that the dynamic equilibrium of the policy game may exhibit history dependency; if the initial stock of international infrastructure is smaller (larger) than a threshold level, the infrastructure stock decreases (increases) over time, and the world economy will end up in autarky (two way free trade) in the long run. We also show that international cooperation is beneficial in the sense that it may enable the world economy to escape from a “low development trap”.

DOI： 10.3390/math9010063

Open Access

Web of Science

Scopus

Web of Science

Publisher：Economics Bulletin  

We examine the effects of stricter environmental policy in a simple oligopolistic general equilibrium model with pollution emitted by oligopolists. We identify a positive general equilibrium effect of stricter environmental policy on firm profits by lowering the wage rate. In some industries, this positive effect exceeds the negative direct effect of the increase in the firms' costs caused by the stricter environmental policy. Thus, in those industries, more stringent environmental policies benefit firms. Despite this possibility of stricter environmental policy benefiting some industries, the total pollution in the economy unambiguously decreases.

Scopus

Language：English   Publisher：The Japan Society of International Economics  

<p>This paper develops a two-country model of intraindustry trade in which overseas shipping incurs transport costs. National governments make investment in the transport infrastructure to reduce the transport costs and enhance national welfare. This paper investigates what patterns of public investment can be derived as equilibrium outcomes and whether these equilibrium investment patterns are socially efficient. It is shown that, among others, if the public investment technology exhibits increasing returns at an international level, coordination problem of public investment may occur.</p>
<p>JEL Classification Number:F12;H54;N70</p>

DOI： 10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.24.02.ay

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：Journal of Public Economic Theory  

We develop a simple model of policy coordination on domestic standards and examine whether domestic standards policy can lead to regional and multilateral harmonization of standards under the principle of national treatment. This paper focuses on mandatory product and process standards affecting the characteristics of a final good that control negative consumption externalities (e.g., vehicle emissions control and safety standards, restrictions on the use of pesticides for agricultural goods, and safety standards for electrical products). Only the products that meet a country's national standards are allowed to circulate in that country's market. Raising standards reduces negative externalities caused by consumption of a traded good but increases firms’ costs. We use the core as the solution concept. A standards regime is considered to be in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition within countries. The main finding is that a multilateral agreement on standards that maximizes world welfare is only in the core if externalities are local or slightly transboundary. Otherwise, only a regional agreement on standards is in the core. As extensions, we consider many and asymmetric number of firms, asymmetry in market size, fixed costs for different standards, and a multilateral agreement on different standards.

DOI： 10.1111/jpet.12425

Open Access

Web of Science

Scopus

Language：Japanese   Publisher：Review of International Economics  

We develop a two-country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid-factor”-type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare-maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.

DOI： 10.1111/roie.12459

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Scopus

Language：English   Publisher：The Japan Society of International Economics  

<p>This study develops a model of international trade under monopolistic competition with non-homothetic quadratic preferences that generate variable markups, and analyzes the effects of trade liberalization and domestic competition policies. It is shown that, among others, trade liberalization may decrease firms’ profits in the short run and increases welfare in the long run. It is also shown that, depending on the parameters of the model, the mass of firms under cooperative solution can be higher or lower than the mass of firms under noncooperative solution.</p><p>JEL classification: F12; L50</p>

DOI： 10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.23.02.ay

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：Finanzarchiv  

This study analyzes Pareto-efficient international taxation, comprising commodity taxes, tariffs, and environmental taxes, in a multicountry economy. In such an economy, each country has a distinct revenue constraint and there are various types of cross-border environmental externalities. We show that Pareto-efficient international taxation is characterized by the standard Ramsey commodity tax rule, the collinearity of the tariff vector, and general-equilibrium Pigouvian environmental taxation. Our Pigouvian tax formula is applicable to a wide variety of contexts, including global, regional, and localized pollution, and it yields important suggestions for the single pricing of cross-border pollution.

DOI： 10.1628/fa-2019-0007

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Scopus

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1007/s00712-018-0614-4

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Scopus

CiNii Research

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.018

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Scopus

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1111/roie.12276

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Scopus

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1007/s00712-016-0519-z

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CiNii Research

CiNii Research

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Authorship：Lead author   Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1111/roie.12166

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1007/s11079-014-9316-x

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1561/102.00000030

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DOI： 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00681.x

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DOI： 10.1111/roie.12004

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DOI： 10.1111/roie.12014

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DOI： 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00636.x

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1080/16081625.2011.9720884

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DOI： 10.1080/16081625.2011.9720883

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.06.010

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DOI： 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00883.x

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1016/j.jjie.2010.03.002

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1628/001522110X549253

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1007/s00712-009-0068-9

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.5652/internationaleconomy.ie2009.03.y

Open Access

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00690.x

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00258.x

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1007/s00712-005-0120-3

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 71-77

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.14991/001.20000401-0219

Open Access